secp256k1-haskell

Haskell bindings to libsecp256k1,
the library that Bitcoin Core uses for elliptic curve cryptography on the
secp256k1 curve. It covers ECDSA signatures, BIP-340 Schnorr signatures,
BIP-341 Taproot tweaks, key tweaking for BIP-32 derivation, and ECDSA public
key recovery for Bitcoin signed messages.
Contents
Why secp256k1-haskell
Elliptic curve cryptography is easy to write and very hard to get right. A
signing routine whose running time depends on the secret key leaks it through
timing. A nonce that repeats once reveals the key outright. An edge case in
point arithmetic accepts a forged signature. These are not theoretical: each has
cost real users real money.
libsecp256k1 is the answer the Bitcoin community converged on. It is
constant-time wherever secrets are involved, blinds secret key operations
against side channels, is tested exhaustively, and has been reviewed for over a
decade. It is what Bitcoin Core runs.
This package lets a Haskell program use that library instead of reimplementing
it, and wraps it in types that make the usual mistakes hard to make. It is the
cryptographic foundation of haskoin-core
and, through it, of the rest of the Haskoin libraries.
Design principles
- Valid by construction. Every key, signature, hash and tweak goes through
a smart constructor or an import function that checks it. A
PubKey is
always a point on the curve; a Sig always has both components in range.
Invalid input is refused where it enters the program, not deep inside a
computation.
- Never abort the process. By default libsecp256k1 calls
abort() on an
illegal argument, which kills the whole Haskell program and cannot be caught.
Every context this package creates installs a callback that makes the C
function fail instead, so a bad argument becomes Nothing, False or an
exception.
- Pure where the mathematics is pure. Signing with deterministic nonces,
verifying, deriving and tweaking keys are pure functions. Only operations
that need fresh randomness run in
IO.
- Standard encodings at the edges.
Show, Read and IsString use SEC1,
compact or plain hex, never libsecp256k1's internal memory layout, which
differs between platforms and library versions.
- Explicit about Bitcoin Core. Where Bitcoin Core goes beyond the
standards, such as grinding signatures to a low R value or accepting high-S
signatures from old blocks, this package offers the behaviour as a separate,
documented function instead of silently picking one.
- Thin. Hashing, address encoding, BIP-32 paths and transaction formats
belong in higher-level libraries such as haskoin-core.
Features
| Area |
What you get |
| ECDSA |
Deterministic RFC 6979 signing, Bitcoin Core's low-R grinding, verification, lower-S normalization |
| Encodings |
SEC1 public keys (33 or 65 bytes), DER and compact signatures, hex Show/Read/IsString |
| Schnorr (BIP-340) |
Signing (deterministic, with given or fresh auxiliary randomness), verification, x-only keys |
| Taproot (BIP-341) |
Tweaking an x-only public key and its secret key |
| Key arithmetic |
Add or multiply secret and public keys by a tweak, negate, combine public keys |
| Recovery |
Recoverable ECDSA signatures and public key recovery, as Bitcoin signed messages use |
| Safety |
Validated values, no aborts, length checks before every C call, contexts shared across threads |
| Testing |
QuickCheck Arbitrary instances for secret keys, hashes and tweaks |
What is not included
- No hashing. Pass a 32-byte hash you computed with a hash library, such as
cryptohash-sha256 or haskoin-core.
- No ECDH, MuSig2 or adaptor signatures, although libsecp256k1 or its
forks offer some of them.
- No secure erasure of secret keys from memory. See Security notes.
Installation
System library
The package needs libsecp256k1
0.2.0 or later and pkg-config to find it. Public key recovery also needs
the library's recovery module, which the packages below include.
# Debian and Ubuntu (24.04 ships 0.2.0)
sudo apt-get install libsecp256k1-dev pkg-config
# Fedora
sudo dnf install libsecp256k1-devel pkgconf
# macOS with Homebrew
brew install secp256k1 pkg-config
# Nix
nix-shell -p secp256k1 pkg-config
Check what you have:
pkg-config --modversion libsecp256k1 # must print 0.2.0 or later
Older distributions, such as Debian 11, ship an earlier version. Build the
library from source then:
git clone https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git
cd secp256k1
./autogen.sh
./configure --enable-module-recovery
make && sudo make install
If your library was built without the recovery module, build this package with
the recovery flag off: stack build --flag secp256k1-haskell:-recovery, or
cabal build -f -recovery. Everything except Crypto.Secp256k1.Recovery still
works.
Step by step with Stack
-
Install Stack and the library above.
-
Create a project:
stack new sig-demo simple
cd sig-demo
-
Add secp256k1-haskell and bytestring to build-depends in
sig-demo.cabal.
-
If your resolver does not include the package, add it to stack.yaml:
extra-deps:
- secp256k1-haskell-2.0.1
- base16-2.0
-
Put the quick start program in src/Main.hs and run it with
stack run. It prints True three times.
With Cabal
build-depends:
base
, bytestring
, secp256k1-haskell
Run cabal update first, then cabal build.
Quick start
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
import Crypto.Secp256k1
main :: IO ()
main = do
ctx <- createContext
-- Hex literals go through IsString, which validates them.
let key = "c7e5a2b4f4c5d7e8a9b0c1d2e3f405162738495a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f70" :: SecKey
hash = "4b688df40bcedbe641ddb16ff0a1842d9c67ea1c3bf63f3e0471baa664531d1a" :: Msg
pub = derivePubKey ctx key
-- ECDSA
let s = signMsg ctx key hash
print (verifySig ctx pub s hash)
-- BIP-340 Schnorr, with fresh auxiliary randomness
schnorr <- signSchnorrIO ctx key hash
print (verifySchnorr ctx pub schnorr hash)
-- Round trip through the standard encodings
let Just pub' = importPubKey ctx (exportPubKey ctx True pub)
print (pub == pub')
Tutorial: sign, verify and serialize
This walks through what a wallet or a protocol implementation typically does,
and why each step looks the way it does.
1. Create one context and share it
ctx <- createContext
A context holds precomputed tables and random blinding values. Creating one is
relatively expensive, and one context can be used by every thread for the life
of the program. createContext randomizes it once, which is what libsecp256k1
recommends.
2. Get keys from bytes
case secKey keyBytes of
Nothing -> fail "not a valid secret key"
Just key -> ...
secKey refuses 0 and numbers not below the curve order, so a SecKey is
always usable. In practice, keys come from a wallet: from a BIP-39 mnemonic and
BIP-32 derivation in haskoin-core, or from 32 bytes of the operating system's
secure randomness (getEntropy 32 from the entropy package).
3. Hash, then sign
The library signs 32-byte hashes, not messages. Which hash to use is part of
the protocol: Bitcoin transactions use double SHA-256 of a specific
serialization, BIP-340 uses tagged hashes. Build the Msg from your hash:
let Just m = msg hashBytes
s = signMsgLowR ctx key m -- or signMsg for plain RFC 6979
Signing is deterministic: the same key and hash give the same signature, so
there is no random number generator to get wrong.
4. Serialize for the wire
Never send the get bytes of a PubKey or Sig: they are libsecp256k1's
internal layout. Use the standard encodings:
let pubBytes = exportPubKey ctx True pub -- 33-byte compressed SEC1
derBytes = exportSig ctx s -- DER, as in Bitcoin transactions
compactBytes = exportCompactSig ctx s -- 64 bytes r || s
5. Parse and verify what you receive
verified = fromMaybe False $ do
pub <- importPubKey ctx pubBytes
s <- importSig ctx derBytes
m <- msg hashBytes
return (verifySig ctx pub (normalizeSig ctx s) m)
Every import returns Maybe, so malformed input is handled in one place.
normalizeSig is there because verifySig only accepts lower-S signatures;
apply it when the signature may come from software that does not produce them,
such as old Bitcoin transactions. Leave it out when your protocol requires
lower-S, as Bitcoin's relay rules do.
6. Move to Schnorr where the protocol allows
sig <- signSchnorrIO ctx key m
let ok = verifySchnorr ctx pub sig m
xonly = exportXOnlyPubKey ctx pub -- 32 bytes, as BIP-340 publishes keys
Schnorr signatures are always 64 bytes, are not malleable, and are what Taproot
uses. signSchnorrIO mixes fresh randomness into the nonce, as BIP-340
recommends, to protect against fault attacks.
Concepts
Values
| Type |
What it holds |
Built with |
SecKey |
32-byte number from 1 to n − 1 |
secKey, IsString |
PubKey |
A point on the curve |
importPubKey, derivePubKey |
Msg |
32-byte hash |
msg |
Sig |
ECDSA signature with both components from 1 to n − 1 |
signMsg, importSig, importCompactSig |
CompactSig |
64 bytes, r ‖ s |
exportCompactSig, compactSig |
SchnorrSig |
64-byte BIP-340 signature |
signSchnorr, schnorrSig |
Tweak |
32-byte number from 0 to n − 1 |
tweak |
RecSig |
ECDSA signature with its recovery id |
signRecMsg, importCompactRecSig |
Here n is the order of the curve. The raw constructors are hidden, so these
are the only ways to build values. Each type has a get field with its bytes.
Contexts
Every operation takes a Ctx. It is created once, shared freely between
threads, and destroyed by the garbage collector. The only operation that
modifies a context is randomizeContext, which needs exclusive access; most
programs never call it.
Errors
Parsing and constructing return Maybe. Arithmetic that can produce an
invalid result, such as a tweak that cancels a key, returns Maybe. Pure
operations on valid values, such as signing, cannot fail and return their
result directly. Programming errors, such as a value of the wrong length built
with an internal constructor, raise an exception.
Usage guide
Lower-S and low-R
isLowS ctx s -- the form verifySig accepts
isLowR ctx s -- r below 2^255, so DER is at most 70 bytes
normalizeSig ctx s -- the lower-S form of any signature
Key tweaking
let Just t = tweak tweakBytes
Just childKey = tweakAddSecKey ctx parentKey t
Just childPub = tweakAddPubKey ctx parentPub t
-- derivePubKey ctx childKey == childPub
This is the operation behind BIP-32 derivation; the tweak itself comes from an
HMAC of the chain code, computed by haskoin-core. tweakMulSecKey,
tweakMulPubKey, tweakNegate and combinePubKeys cover the other group
operations.
Taproot
let Just t = tweak taprootTweakBytes -- tagged hash of key and script tree
Just outputKey = tweakAddXOnlyPubKey ctx internalKey t
Just outputSecKey = tweakAddXOnlySecKey ctx internalSecKey t
Computing the tweak, a BIP-341 tagged hash, is left to the caller.
Bitcoin signed messages
import Crypto.Secp256k1.Recovery
let r = signRecMsg ctx key m
(compact, recId) = exportCompactRecSig ctx r
-- the 65-byte message signature is a header byte (27 + recId, + 4 if the key
-- is compressed) followed by the 64 compact bytes
recover ctx r m -- Just the signer's PubKey
Testing with QuickCheck
SecKey, Msg and Tweak have Arbitrary instances, so properties can
range over them directly. With a context ctx created once for the test suite:
prop_roundTrip :: SecKey -> Msg -> Bool
prop_roundTrip key m =
verifySig ctx (derivePubKey ctx key) (signMsg ctx key m) m
Differences from Bitcoin Core
| Topic |
This package |
Bitcoin Core |
| ECDSA nonce |
signMsg: plain RFC 6979 |
Grinds for low R |
| Low-R signatures |
signMsgLowR: same grinding, same signatures |
Default since 0.17 |
| High-S signatures |
verifySig refuses them; use normalizeSig |
Normalizes before verifying |
| Verify after ECDSA signing |
No |
Yes, as a precaution |
| Taproot tweak when signing |
Separate step: tweakAddXOnlySecKey |
Built into Schnorr signing |
| Message signatures |
signRecMsg, no grinding |
Same, so signatures are identical |
Module overview
| Module |
Contents |
Crypto.Secp256k1 |
The public API: contexts, keys, ECDSA, Schnorr, tweaks |
Crypto.Secp256k1.Recovery |
Recoverable signatures and public key recovery |
Crypto.Secp256k1.Internal.* |
Raw constructors and foreign imports; no stability promise |
Security notes
- Secret keys stay in memory. A
SecKey is an ordinary ByteString. The
garbage collector may copy it, and nothing clears it when it is no longer
used. If your threat model includes an attacker reading process memory,
keep keys in a hardware device instead.
Show prints secret keys. Showing a record that holds a SecKey, in a
log line or an error message, reveals it.
- Verification only proves what was signed. It is your protocol's job to
hash the right data; signing a hash an attacker chose is as good as signing
whatever they want.
- Use fresh randomness for Schnorr when you can.
signSchnorrIO protects
against fault attacks that deterministic signing does not.
- Keep libsecp256k1 up to date. Security fixes land in the C library;
this package only binds it.
Development
git clone https://github.com/jprupp/secp256k1-haskell.git
cd secp256k1-haskell
stack build # build against the system library
stack --nix build # or take GHC and libsecp256k1 from nixpkgs
stack test # run the tests
stack haddock --no-haddock-deps # build the API documentation
package.yaml is the source of the package description. Change it rather than
secp256k1-haskell.cabal, which hpack
generates.
The tests are in test/ and use hspec and
QuickCheck, with published test vectors from RFC 6979, Bitcoin Core and
BIP-340. CI runs them with the system library and
with stack --nix.
Contributing
Pull requests are welcome.
- Add tests for the behaviour you change, with published test vectors where
they exist.
- Keep the documentation in step with the code, as
CLAUDE.md describes.
- Describe the change in
CHANGELOG.md, which follows
Keep a Changelog.
- haskoin-core builds Bitcoin keys,
addresses, transactions and PSBTs on this package.
- libsecp256k1 is the C library
underneath.
License
secp256k1-haskell is released under the
MIT License.