

CPSA Security Goals and Rules

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Contents

1	Introduction	3
2	Syntax	6
3	Semantics	8
4	Examples	10
4.1	Needham-Schroeder Responder	10
4.2	A Needham-Schroeder Secrecy Goal	12
5	The Rest of the Story	12
5.1	Shape Analysis Sentences	14
6	Rules	15
6.1	Facts	15
6.2	DoorSEP	16

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List of Figures

1	Needham-Schroeder Initiator and Responder Roles	4
2	Needham-Schroeder Initiator Point of View	5
3	Needham-Schroeder Responder Point of View	11
4	Needham-Schroeder Secrecy Goal	12
5	Two Initiator Authentication Goals	13
6	Initiator Shape Analysis Sentence	14
7	DoorSEP Protocol	16
8	DoorSEP Weakness	17
9	Door Simple Example Protocol	18

List of Tables

1	Predicates	7
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1 Introduction

Analyzing a cryptographic protocol means finding out what security properties—essentially, authentication and secrecy properties—are true in all its possible executions.

Given a protocol definition and some assumptions about executions, CPSA attempts to produce descriptions of all possible executions of the protocol compatible with the assumptions. Naturally, there are infinitely many possible executions of a useful protocol, since different participants can run it with varying parameters, and the participants can run it repeatedly.

However, for many naturally occurring protocols, there are only finitely many of these runs that are essentially different. Indeed, there are frequently very few, often just one or two, even in cases where the protocol is flawed. We call these essentially different executions the *shapes* of the protocol. Authentication and secrecy properties are easy to “read off” from the shapes, as are attacks and anomalies, according to the introduction in the CPSA Primer [4].

But how easy is it to read off authentication and secrecy properties? What precisely is it that an expert sees? This paper describes CPSA’s support for reasoning about security goals using first-order logic. With security goals expressed in first-order logic, intuition is replaced by determining if a formula is true in all executions of the protocol.

This treatment of security goals relies heavily on a branch of first-order logic called model theory. It deals with the relationship between descriptions in first-order languages and the structures that satisfy these descriptions. In our case, the structures are skeletons that denote a collection of executions of a protocol. This paper attempts to describe the language of security goals and its structures without requiring the reader to have studied model theory.

The model theoretical foundation of this approach to security goals appears in [1]. A practical use of security goals in protocol standardization is described in [2]. The precise semantics of the goal language is in [5, Appendix C]. The syntax of security goals appears in [4, Table 2].

The distribution in which this paper is included contains the sample input CPSA file `goals.scm`. It contains the examples in this paper. You are encouraged to run the examples and examine the output while reading this paper.

The CPSA Primer [4] is a prerequisite for reading this paper. In particular, the Needham-Schroeder Protocol in Section 10 is reanalyzed using security goals here. The roles are displayed in Figure 1.



```

(defprotocol ns basic
  (defrole init
    (vars (a b name) (n1 n2 text))
    (trace
      (send (enc n1 a (pubk b)))
      (recv (enc n1 n2 (pubk a)))
      (send (enc n2 (pubk b))))))
  (defrole resp
    (vars (b a name) (n2 n1 text))
    (trace
      (recv (enc n1 a (pubk b)))
      (send (enc n1 n2 (pubk a)))
      (recv (enc n2 (pubk b))))))

```


Figure 1: Needham-Schroeder Initiator and Responder Roles

```

(defgoal ns                               ; Goal
  (forall ((b name) (n1 text) (z0 strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "init" z0 3) (p "init" "n1" z0 n1)
            (p "init" "b" z0 b) (non (privk b)) (uniq n1))
      (exists ((z1 strd))
        (and (p "resp" z1 2) (p "resp" "b" z1 b))))))

(defskeleton ns                             ; Point of view skeleton
  (vars (a b name) (n1 n2 text))
  (defstrand init 3 (a a) (b b) (n1 n1) (n2 n2))
  (non-orig (privk b))
  (uniq-orig n1))

```



```

(defskeleton ns                             ; Shape
  (vars (n1 n2 text) (a b name))
  (defstrand init 3 (n1 n1) (n2 n2) (a a) (b b))
  (defstrand resp 2 (n2 n2-0) (n1 n1) (b b) (a a))
  (precedes ((0 0) (1 0)) ((1 1) (0 1)))
  (non-orig (privk b))
  (uniq-orig n1)
  (satisfies yes))

```

Figure 2: Needham-Schroeder Initiator Point of View

The protocol is analyzed from the point of view of a complete run of one instance of the initiator role. The input security goal, followed by the point of view skeleton it generates and the shape produced by CPSA, are shown in Figure 2. The syntax and semantics of the goal will be explained later. Roughly speaking, it asserts that if a realized skeleton contains a full length initiator strand, its private key is uncompromised, and it uniquely generates `n1`, then the skeleton will contain a responder strand that agrees with the initiator on the name `b`. The shape produced by CPSA contains the annotation `(satisfies yes)`. This indicates that its structure satisfies the description given by the security goal. It will be explained later why the properties of CPSA allows us to conclude that this goal is true in all executions of the protocol, and therefore conclude that the Needham-Schroeder protocol achieves this authentication goal.

2 Syntax

To be precise, a security goal is an order-sorted first-order logic sentence in a restricted form. The sentence in Figure 2 has the form shared by all security goals. It is a universally quantified implication. The antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. For this sentence, the conclusion is an existentially quantified conjunction of atomic formulas, but in general, the conclusion is a disjunction of existentially quantified conjunctions of atomic formulas. In what follows, `(false)` is a synonym for the empty disjunction, `(or)`.

```

GOAL ← (defgoal PROT SENT+ COMMENTS)
SENT ← (forall (DECL*) (implies ANTEC CONCL))
CONCL ← (false) | EXISTL | (or EXISTL*)
EXISTL ← (exists (DECL*) ANTEC) | ANTEC
ANTEC ← ATOMIC | (and ATOMIC+)

```

Variables are declared as they are for roles and skeletons with one exception, there is a new sort symbol `strd` for strands. Notice that in the sentence in Figure 2, variables `z0` and `z1` have sort `strd`. Every universally quantified variable must occur in the antecedent of the implication.

The signature as been expanded to include the natural numbers. A natural number has sort `nat`.

Symbol	Sort	Description
p ROLE	strd \times nat	Role strand length
p ROLE PARAM	strd \times mesg	Role parameter
prec	strd \times nat \times strd \times nat	Precedes
non	atom	Non-origination
pnon	atom	Penetrator non-origination
uniq	atom	Unique origination
uniq-at	atom \times strd \times nat	Unique origination on strand
auth	chan	Authenticated channel
conf	chan	Confidential channel
=	all \times all	Equality

Table 1: Predicates

The predicates used to construct an atomic formula (ATOMIC) are listed in Table 1. There are two classes of predicates, protocol specific and protocol independent predicates, and two kinds of protocol specific predicates, role strand length and role parameter predicates. Protocol specific predicates are distinguished from protocol independent predicates by beginning with the symbol **p**.

The first line of the table gives the syntax of a role strand length predicate. It contains two tokens, **p** and a string that names a role. That is, for role r , there is a role strand length predicate, **p** r . Thus (**p** "init" z0 3) is an atomic formula using the role strand length predicate for length 3 in the **init** role of the protocol in Figure 1.

The second line gives the syntax of a role parameter predicate. It contains three tokens, **p**, a string that names a role, and a string that names a role variable. For role r , there is role parameter predicate for each variable declared by r . Thus (**p** "init" "n1" z0 n1) is an atomic formula using the role parameter predicate for parameter n1 in the **init** role of the protocol.

The empty string names the listener role of a protocol. The role has the variable x of sort **mesg** as its only role variable. There are two positions in the listener role. Its trace is (**trace** (**recv** x) (**send** x)).

When a variable of sort **strd** occurs in a formula, its length must be specified using a role strand length formula. When an algebra variable occurs in a formula, its association with the parameter of some role must be specified using a role parameter formula.

3 Semantics

In a `defgoal` sentence, the antecedent specifies the point of view skeleton. We focus on the antecedent. In the example,

```
(defstrand init 3 (a a) (b b) (n1 n1) (n2 n2))
```

is extracted from

```
(and (p "init" z0 3)
      (p "init" "n1" z0 n1) (p "init" "b" z0 b)).
```

Notice that CPSA adds a binding for `a` and `n2` just as it does had

```
(defstrand init 3 (b b) (n1 n1))
```

been given as input.

Our aim now is to specify how to decide if a security goal is true in all possible executions of a protocol. A skeleton defines a set of executions that contain the skeleton's structure. We say a skeleton *satisfies* a formula if the skeleton contains all of the structure specified by the formula. To decide if a skeleton satisfies a formula, we decide if it satisfies each of its atomic formulas, and combine the results using the rules of first-order logic.

Atomic formula `(p "init" z0 3)` is called a role strand length formula. A skeleton k satisfies the formula if $z0$ maps to a strand s in k such that

1. the trace of strand s in k has a length greater than 2, and
2. the trace when truncated to length 3 is an instance of the `init` role.

Consider the shape in Figure 2. It satisfies `(p "init" z0 3)` when $z0$ maps to 0.

Atomic formula `(p "init" "n1" z0 n1)` is called a role parameter formula. A skeleton k satisfies the formula if $z0$ maps to strand s in k , $n1$ first occurs in at position i in the trace of the `init` role, and $n1$ maps to a message algebra term t in k such that

1. the trace of strand s in k has a length greater than i ,
2. the trace truncated to length $i + 1$ is an instance of the `init` role, and

3. the truncated trace is compatible with mapping the `init` role's `"n1"` role variable to t .

The shape in Figure 2 satisfies `(p "init" "n1" z0 n1)` when `z0` maps to 0 and `n1` maps to the message algebra term `n1`.

Collectively, a skeleton satisfies the formula

```
(and (p "init" z0 3)
      (p "init" "a" z0 a) (p "init" "b" z0 b)
      (p "init" "n1" z0 n1) (p "init" "n2" z0 n2))
```

if the skeleton contains the structure specified by

```
(defstrand init 3 (a a) (b b) (n1 n1) (n2 n2)).
```

The antecedent in Figure 2 contains two origination assertions. The formula `(non (privk b))` is extracted as `(privk b)`. A skeleton k satisfies the formula if `b` maps to a message algebra term t in k such that k assumes that t is non-originating. The unique origination formula for `n1` is similarly extracted.

Putting it all together, the mapping

$$\{\mathbf{n1} \mapsto \mathbf{n1}, \mathbf{n2} \mapsto \mathbf{n2}, \mathbf{a} \mapsto \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \mapsto \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{z0} \mapsto 0\}$$

shows that the shape in Figure 2 satisfies the antecedent of the security goal.

The `prec` predicate is used to assert a node precedes another node. The conclusion in Figure 2 with `(prec z1 1 z0 2)` added is satisfied by the shape using the mapping `z0` \mapsto 0 and `z1` \mapsto 1.

The `uniq-at` predicate is used to assert not only that an atom uniquely originates, but also the node at which it originates. In the Figure 2 goal, the `(uniq n1)` formula could have been replaced by `(uniq-at n1 z0 0)`. The extracted point of view skeleton is the same.

Recall that our aim in analyzing a protocol is to find out what security goals are true in all of its possible executions. We are interested in runs of CPSA that show that when every shape satisfies a goal, it is true in every execution.

When CPSA performs a shape analysis, every shape it generates refines the input skeleton. Skeleton refinement is defined in [4, Section 6]. The definition makes precise the notion of structure containment, as skeleton A refines skeleton B if and only if A contains the structure of skeleton B .

The skeleton k_0 extracted from the antecedent of a security goal has the property that a skeleton refines k_0 if and only if it satisfies the antecedent. A skeleton with this property is called the *characteristic skeleton* of the antecedent.

Given a goal Φ , consider a shape analysis starting from the characteristic skeleton k_0 of its antecedent. Assume CPSA finds shapes k_1, \dots, k_n and that CPSA determines that each k_i satisfies Φ . Consider the executions that contain the structure in k_0 . CPSA tells us that each execution is in the executions that contain the structure of some k_i . Furthermore, because k_0 is a characteristic skeleton, each k_i satisfies the antecedent of Φ . Executions that do not contain the structure in k_0 do not satisfy the antecedent. Therefore, Φ is true in all executions of the protocol and maximally informative.

4 Examples

This section contains examples of both authentication and secrecy goals. The first example shows the feedback the user receives when a shape does not satisfy a security goal. The second example shows how to use a listener to state a secrecy goal.

4.1 Needham-Schroeder Responder

Figure 3 contains an analysis of Needham-Schroeder from the point of view of a complete run of the responder under the assumption that the responder’s private key is uncompromised and the nonce it generates uniquely originates.

The conclusion of the goal asserts that in an execution compatible with the point of view, there must be an initiator strand that agrees with the responder strand on the name \mathbf{b} . The shape produced by CPSA is a counterexample to this assertion. Because of this, CPSA annotates the shape with

```
(satisfies (no (a a) (b b) (n2 n2) (z0 0))).
```

The annotation includes a variable mapping for the shape that satisfies the antecedent of the goal but does not satisfy its conclusion. The reason the shape does not satisfy the goal is because the mapping $(\mathbf{b} \ \mathbf{b})$ maps the initiator’s \mathbf{b} parameter to \mathbf{b} , not $\mathbf{b-0}$ as is required to model the shape.


Galvin Lowe identified this authentication failure in Needham-Schroeder and provided a fix. In the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol, the name \mathbf{b}

```

(defgoal ns ; Goal
  (forall ((a b name) (n2 text) (z0 strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "resp" z0 3) (p "resp" "n2" z0 n2)
        (p "resp" "a" z0 a) (p "resp" "b" z0 b)
        (non (privk a)) (uniq n2))
      (exists ((z1 strd))
        (and (p "init" z1 2) (p "init" "b" z1 b))))))

(defskeleton ns ; Point of view skeleton
  (vars (a b name) (n1 n2 text))
  (defstrand resp 3 (a a) (b b) (n1 n1) (n2 n2))
  (non-orig (privk a))
  (uniq-orig n2))

```



```

(defskeleton ns ; Shape
  (vars (n1 n2 text) (a b b-0 name))
  (defstrand resp 3 (n2 n2) (n1 n1) (b b) (a a))
  (defstrand init 3 (n1 n1) (n2 n2) (a a) (b b-0))
  (precedes ((0 1) (1 1)) ((1 2) (0 2)))
  (non-orig (privk a))
  (uniq-orig n2)
  (satisfies (no (a a) (b b) (n2 n2) (z0 0))))

```

Figure 3: Needham-Schroeder Responder Point of View

```

(defgoal ns
  (forall ((a b name) (n1 text) (z0 z1 strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "init" z0 3) (p "init" "n1" z0 n1)
            (p "init" "a" z0 a) (p "init" "b" z0 b)
            (p "" z1 1) (p "" "x" z1 n1) ; Listener
            (non (privk a)) (non (privk b))
            (uniq n1))
      (false))))

```

Figure 4: Needham-Schroeder Secrecy Goal

is included within the encryption in second message of both roles. With this modification, the shape found by CPSA satisfies the security goal in Figure 3, so Needham-Schroeder-Lowe achieves this authentication goal.

4.2 A Needham-Schroeder Secrecy Goal

Figure 4 contains an analysis of Needham-Schroeder from the point of view of a complete run of the initiator under the assumption that the responder's and its peer's private keys are uncompromised and the nonce `n1` it generates uniquely originates. Furthermore, the point of view asserts that the nonce is leaked using a listener.

```

(p "" z1 1) (p "" "x" z1 n1) ; Listener

```

CPSA finds no shapes, so Needham-Schroeder achieves this secrecy goal and does not leak `n1`.

5 The Rest of the Story

The examples in the previous section demonstrate the typical way security goals are analyzed with CPSA. However, there are more features that may be useful.

A `defgoal` form may contain more than one sentence. See Figure 5 for an example. When presented with more than one sentence, CPSA extracts the point of view skeleton from the first sentence.

```

(defgoal ns
  (forall ((a b name) (n text) (z0 strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "init" z0 2) (p "init" "n1" z0 n)
            (p "init" "a" z0 a) (p "init" "b" z0 b)
            (non (privk a)) (non (privk b)) (uniq n))
      (exists ((z1 strd))
        (and (p "resp" z1 2) (p "resp" "b" z1 b))))))
  (forall ((a b name) (n text) (z0 strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "init" z0 2) (p "init" "n1" z0 n)
            (p "init" "a" z0 a) (p "init" "b" z0 b)
            (non (privk a)) (non (privk b)) (uniq n))
      (exists ((z1 strd))
        (and (p "resp" z1 2) (p "resp" "a" z1 a))))))

```

Figure 5: Two Initiator Authentication Goals

It is wise to ensure that the antecedent in every sentence is identical. When CPSA performs satisfaction-checking on sentence Φ , it only determines if each shape it finds is satisfied. If the point of view skeleton is not the characteristic skeleton of the antecedent of Φ , the fact that all skeletons satisfy Φ cannot be used to conclude that Φ is true in all executions of the protocol.

CPSA performs satisfaction-checking when an input skeleton is annotated with one or more security goals. The annotation uses the `goals` key.

```

(defskeleton
  ...
  (goals SENT+))

```

The program `cpsasas`, discussed in the next section, can be used to generate a formula with an antecedent such that the input skeleton is the characteristic skeleton of the antecedent.

```

(defgoal ns
  (forall ((n1 n2 text) (b a name) (z strd))
    (implies
      (and (p "init" z 3) (p "init" "n1" z n1)
            (p "init" "n2" z n2) (p "init" "a" z a)
            (p "init" "b" z b) (non (privk b)) (uniq-at n1 z 0))
      (exists ((n2-0 text) (z-0 strd))
        (and (p "resp" z-0 2) (p "resp" "n2" z-0 n2-0)
              (p "resp" "n1" z-0 n1) (p "resp" "b" z-0 b)
              (p "resp" "a" z-0 a) (prec z 0 z-0 0)
              (prec z-0 1 z 1))))))

```

Figure 6: Initiator Shape Analysis Sentence

5.1 Shape Analysis Sentences

A shape analysis sentence expresses all that can be learned from a run of CPSA as a security goal. If a security goal can be derived from a shape analysis sentence, then the protocol achieves the security goal, that is, the goal is true in all executions of the protocol.

The program `cpsasas` extracts shape analysis sentences from the output of CPSA. Consider the first example in this paper (Figure 2), which is in the sample file `goals.scm`. To generate a maximally informative security goal from the initiator point of view with `ghci` and `Make.hs`, type

```

$ ghci Make.hs
*Make> sas "goals"

```

When using GNU make, type “`make goals_sas.text`”. The resulting shape analysis sentence is displayed in Figure 6.

A shape analysis sentence asserts that either a realized skeleton does not satisfy its antecedent or it satisfies one or more of the disjuncts in its conclusion. CPSA has been designed so that this assertion is true. Therefore, every shape analysis sentence is true in all executions.

A security goal is true in all executions if it can be derived from a shape analysis sentence [3]. In practice, theorem-proving using shape analysis sentences is rarely employed. It’s clumsy and it requires too much expertise. The main use of `cpsasas` is for generating a formula that is edited to become a desired security goal.

6 Rules

Support for rules was introduced in version 4.1 of CPSA.

Each protocol includes a small collection of rules. A rule is a sentence in the goal language presented in Section 2. Rules are defined after the roles of a protocol are defined. The syntax of a rule follows.

```
RULE ← (defrule NAME SENT COMMENTS)
```

A rule is an axiom added to a protocol. CPSA uses the axiom as a rewrite rule to derive zero or more new skeletons from a skeleton produced during a step. An example of a protocol with a rule is in Figure 9 on Page 18.

The trust rule states that when CPSA finds a person strand of length at least one, and the inverse of it's `p` parameter is non-originating, CPSA should assume the inverse of it's `d` parameter is non-originating.

6.1 Facts

Each skeleton includes a small database of facts. A fact is a named relation among fact terms. A fact term is either a strand of the skeleton or an algebra term. A set of facts is defined anywhere after strands are defined using the `facts` form. The syntax of facts follows.

```
FACTS ← (facts FACT*)  
FACT ← (SYMBOL FTERM*)  
FTERM ← MSG | NAT
```

For example, in a skeleton, a user may want to note that strand 0 owns the private key for `a` by assuming.

```
(facts (owns 0 (privk a)))
```

Facts are most useful when combined with rules. Here is an example of their combination. Suppose a point of view skeleton has two names, `a` and `b`, and the problem is modeling a situation in which the two names are known to differ. To enforce this constraint, add

```
(facts (neq a b))
```

to the point of view skeleton and the `neq` rule below to the protocol.




Figure 7: DoorSEP Protocol

```
(defrule neq
  (forall ((a mesg))
    (implies
      (fact neq a a)
      (false))))
```

6.2 DoorSEP

As a motivating scenario consider the Door Simple Example Protocol (DoorSEP), derived from an expository protocol that was designed to have a weakness. Despite this, the protocol achieves the needs of an application, given a trust assumption.

Imagine a door D which is equipped with a badge reader, and a person P equipped with a badge. When the person swipes the badge, the protocol executes. Principals such as doors or persons are identified by the public parts of their key pairs, with D^{-1} and P^{-1} being the corresponding private keys. We write $\{M\}_K$ for the encryption of message M with key K . We represent digital signatures $\{M\}_{P^{-1}}$ as if they were the result of encrypting with P 's private key.

P initiates the exchange by creating a fresh symmetric key K , signing it, and sending it to the door D encrypted with the door's public key. D extracts the symmetric key after checking the signature, freshly generates a token T , and sends it—encrypted with the symmetric key—back to P . P demonstrates they are authorized to enter by decrypting the token and sending it as plaintext to the door. The two roles of DoorSEP are shown in Fig. 7, where each vertical column displays the behavior of one of the roles. The CPSA4 encoding of the roles is in Figure 9.

CPSA finds an undesirable execution of DoorSEP. Assume the person's




Figure 8: DoorSEP Weakness

private key P^{-1} is uncompromised and the door has received the token it sent out. Then CPSA finds that P freshly created the symmetric key K . However, nothing ensures that the person meant to open door D . If P ever initiates a run with a compromised door C , the adversary can perform a man-in-the-middle attack, decrypting using the compromised key C^{-1} and re-encrypting with D 's public key, as elided in the \dots in Fig. 8. To verify this result with CPSA4, remove the trust axiom in the doorsep protocol in `doc/rules.scm` and run CPSA4. Thus, without additional assumptions, the door cannot authenticate the person requesting entry.

But possibly we can trust the person to swipe her badge only in front of doors our organization controls. And we can ensure that our doors have uncompromised private keys. If so, then the adversary cannot exercise the flaw.

We regard this as a *trust assumption*, and we can express it as an axiom:

Trust Assumption 1 *If an uncompromised signing key P^{-1} is used to prepare an instance of the first DoorSEP message, then its owning principal has ensured that the selected door D has an uncompromised private key.*

The responsibility for ensuring the truth of this axiom may be split between P and the organization controlling D . P makes sure to swipe her badge only at legitimate doors of the organization's buildings. The organization maintains a security posture that protects the corresponding private keys.

Is DoorSEP good enough, assuming the trust axiom? Add the trust axiom back to the doorsep protocol in `doc/rules.scm` and see. You should find that the protocol does its job; namely, ensuring that the door opens only when an authorized person requests it to open.

```

(defprotocol doorsep basic
  (defrole person
    (vars (d p akey) (k skey) (t text))
    (trace
      (send (enc (enc k (invk p)) d))
      (recv (enc t k))
      (send t)))
  (defrole door
    (vars (d p akey) (k skey) (t text))
    (trace
      (recv (enc (enc k (invk p)) d))
      (send (enc t k))
      (recv t)))
  (defrule trust
    (forall ((z strd) (p d akey))
      (implies
        (and (p "person" z 1)
              (p "person" "p" z p)
              (p "person" "d" z d)
              (non (invk p)))
          (non (invk d))))
    (comment "The trust rule"))
  (comment "Doorsep protocol using unnamed asymmetric keys"))

(defskeleton doorsep
  (vars (p akey))
  (defstrand door 3 (p p))
  (non-orig (invk p))
  (comment "Analyze from the doors's perspective"))

```

Figure 9: Door Simple Example Protocol

References

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